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INTRODUCTION 
Elections have consequences. In the 2010 U.S. midterm elections, the 
Republican Party made historic congressional gains.1 After the election, 
much political discourse focused on the incoming battle between the new 
Republican Congress and President Barack Obama.2 Yet the midterm 
results affected much more than the presidential agenda, as the 
Republican Party also achieved impressive state-level gains that resulted 
                                                                                                                     
 * LL.M. in Taxation Candidate, 2017; J.D., 2016, University of Florida Levin College of 
Law; B.A. in Economics and Classical Studies, 2013, University of Florida. I would like to thank 
all my family and friends for their immense support as well as the editors of the Florida Law 
Review for their tireless efforts. 
 1. James E. Campbell, The Midterm Landslide of 2010: A Triple Wave Election, FORUM, 
Dec. 2010, at 1, 1, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.421.1773&rep=rep 
1&type=pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., Paul Harris & Ewen MacAskill, US Midterm Election Results Herald New 
Political Era as Republicans Take House, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2010, 12:22 PM), http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2010/nov/03/us-midterm-election-results-tea-party.  
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in control of many legislative chambers nationwide.3 These sweeping 
state-level gains did not affect policy alone. The Democratic Party—and 
the Republican Party in several “blue” states4—paid a drastic price: the 
gerrymandered results of the 2010 decennial redistricting cycle.5 
As a partisan tool, gerrymandering refers to drawing electoral districts 
“in a manner that intentionally discriminates against a political party.”6 
Although the practice of gerrymandering is historically common, state 
legislatures arguably gerrymandered to an even higher degree during the 
2010 redistricting cycle.7 Not all states face gerrymandering issues, 
however. In fact, several states have curtailed legislative gerrymandering 
while others have completely removed the legislature’s redistricting 
power. For example, Florida voters approved a ballot proposal amending 
the state’s constitution to set strict guidelines on the legislature’s 
redistricting.8 In California, a voter initiative established an independent 
redistricting commission to combat problems associated with 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Campbell, supra note 1, at 1. 
 4. The Republicans did not sweep every competitive state race in 2010. For example, the 
incumbent Democratic governor of Illinois survived a Republican challenge in a very close race. 
JOHN S. JACKSON, PAUL SIMON PUB. POLICY INST., THE 2010 ELECTIONS: ILLINOIS STILL BLUE 
DESPITE THE RED WAVE THAT SWEPT THE NATION 2 (2011), http://paulsimoninstitute.siu.edu/_com 
mon/documents/simon-review/paper-22-final.pdf. This resulted in several Republican members 
of the Illinois congressional delegation receiving politically unfriendly districts. See James 
Warren, Redistricting Squeezes G.O.P. Class of 2010, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/us/10cncwarren.html. 
 5. Several prognosticators warned of these consequences before the midterm election. See, 
e.g., Mara Liasson, Midterm Elections Play Major Role in Redistricting, NPR (Sept. 21, 2010, 
4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130011228; Peter Roff, 
Election 2010 Redistricting Gains Will Give GOP Lasting Majority, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 28, 2010, 
9:20 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2010/09/28/election-2010-redistrict 
ing-gains-will-give-gop-lasting-majority. 
 6. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 115 (2009); 
accord Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403, 405 (1993). 
Gerrymandering can also encompass drawing district lines to discriminate against a certain 
minority group. Howard M. Shapiro, Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering 
and the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189, 189–90 (1984). For this Comment’s purposes, 
gerrymandering does not encompass racial gerrymandering. 
 7. See Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/. 
 8. J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform to Rein 
in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 557 (2011). The Florida Constitution 
now mandates that “[i]n establishing congressional district boundaries[,] [n]o apportionment plan 
[by the legislature] . . . shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an 
incumbent; and . . . districts shall be . . . nearly equal in population[,] . . . compact[,] and . . . where 
feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.” FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 20. This 
amendment has curbed extensive gerrymandering in Florida. After extensive litigation, the Florida 
Supreme Court struck down several congressional districts that the Florida legislature drew 
following the 2010 redistricting cycle. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 
3d 363, 413–14 (Fla. 2015). 
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gerrymandering.9  
Some observers likened California’s commission to the one Arizona 
voters enacted almost a decade before,10 the Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission (AIRC).11 However, these two commissions 
had one key difference: Arizona’s initiative authorized legislative party 
leaders to appoint members onto the AIRC,12 making it inherently more 
partisan. While some heralded the initiative as “the most advanced 
citizen-based approach” to redistricting when enacted,13 this wrinkle of 
partisan appointment was controversial and almost led to the destruction 
of all independent redistricting reform. After the 2010 redistricting 
process in Arizona, the AIRC’s debatably partisan map aided Democratic 
candidates in winning additional seats the following election.14 Angered, 
various Republicans attacked the AIRC commissioners as biased and 
“unaccountable to the people.”15 In turn, the growing crescendo of attacks 
resulted in a massive legal battle between the Arizona legislature and the 
AIRC that would culminate in a narrow five-to-four decision—Arizona 
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.16 
In June 2012, the Arizona legislature sued the AIRC and its members, 
arguing that Proposition 106—the voter initiative creating the AIRC—
                                                                                                                     
 9. See Karin Mac Donald, Adventures in Redistricting: A Look at the California 
Redistricting Commission, 11 ELECTION L.J. 472, 474–75 (2012). Subsequently, another 
proposition added congressional redistricting to the scope of the commission. Id. at 477. 
 10. See, e.g., RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE DRAW THE LINES: AN EXAMINATION 
OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE 2 (2013), https://cavotes.org/sites/default/ 
files/jobs/RedistrictingCommission%20Report6122013.pdf; Aaron Blake, California-Size 
Overhaul Not Likely with Arizona Redistricting Commission, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Aug. 17, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/california-size-overhaul-not-likely-with-arizona 
-redistricting-commission/2011/08/17/gIQAZyqbLJ_blog.html; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court 
Rebuffs Lawmakers over Independent Redistricting Panel, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/supreme-court-upholds-creation-of-arizona-redistricting-com 
mission.html. 
 11. See SONENSHEIN, supra note 10, at 2 n.5. 
 12. See id. at 2 n.5, 12. In contrast, California’s Citizens Redistricting Committee was 
created to “weed out those with conflicts of interest and strong partisan affiliation, and find 
qualified candidates” in its selection process. Mac Donald, supra note 9, at 475. 
 13. SONENSHEIN, supra note 10, at 11. 
 14. See Samantha Lachman, Supreme Court Upholds Arizona’s Independent Redistricting 
Committee, HUFFPOST POL. (June 29, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/
06/29/arizona-redistricting-supreme-court_n_7470488.html. For an overview of the redrawn 
districts, see Final Congressional & Legislative Maps Adopted 1.17.2012, ARIZ. INDEP. 
REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://azredistricting.org/Maps/Final-Maps/default.asp (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2016). 
 15. Lachman, supra note 14; accord Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Redistricting Case Nearing a 
Decision, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar. 29, 2013, 10:39 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/ 
articles/20130329arizona-redistricting-case-nearing-decision.html. 
 16. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
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was unconstitutional.17 A three-judge panel ruled that the legislature had 
standing by showing “its loss of redistricting power constitute[d] a 
concrete injury,” but dismissed the claims that the AIRC’s existence was 
unconstitutional.18 Subsequently, the Supreme Court accepted 
jurisdiction on the case.19 Many worried that the Court would invalidate 
all redistricting reform that did not originate in a state legislature.20 
During the case’s oral argument,21 the Court appeared to be narrowly 
divided on the actual merits, i.e. whether the word “legislature,” as used 
in the U.S. Constitution’s Election Clause, literally meant that only the 
legislature could draw congressional districts.22 If the Court had ruled in 
favor of this interpretation, it would not only have struck down the AIRC, 
but other states’ redistricting committees as well.23 
This Comment discusses how the Arizona State Legislature majority 
reached its decision to uphold independent redistricting commissions, 
addresses issues that several of the dissenters raised, and analyzes how 
the decision will impact partisan gerrymandering and future redistricting 
reform. Part I briefly overviews reapportionment, gerrymandering, and 
redistricting reform. Part II then examines Arizona State Legislature and 
provides the legal and political context for the nearly five-year debate 
over the AIRC. Finally, Part III explores potential legal and policy 
ramifications of the decision on the future of partisan gerrymandering and 
redistricting reform. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 2662. 
 18. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 
1050, 1056 (D. Ariz. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2652. 
 19. David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Review Independent Redistricting Commissions, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-court-redistricting-
20141003-story.html. 
 20. In fact, some House members even introduced a bill to preempt the Court. See The 
Citizen’s Districts Preservation Act, H.R. 2501, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015). 
 21. Transcript of Oral Argument, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-1314_q8l1.pdf. 
 22. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Seems Divided over Independent Redistricting 
Commissions, NPR (Mar. 3, 2015, 12:49 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/02/390245031/high-
court-case-tests-independent-redistricting-commissions. 
 23. See Jessica Taylor, One-Third of Congressional Districts Could Be Affected by Supreme 
Court Ruling, NPR (June 28, 2015, 7:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/28/41 
7530683/one-third-of-congressional-districts-could-be-affected-by-supreme-court-ruling; see 
also Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2662 (discussing how “[s]everal other States, as a means to 
curtail partisan gerrymandering, have also provided for the participation of commissions in 
redistricting”). 
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I.  CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT, GERRYMANDERING, AND 
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING IN A NUTSHELL 
Since the Constitution’s ratification, state legislatures have held the 
power to redistrict the House of Representatives. There is a constitutional 
mandate to apportion representatives “according to their respective 
Numbers, which shall be determined by [the U.S. population],” and that 
the reapportionment of districts “shall be made . . . every . . . ten Years.”24 
Congress fulfills this duty via the U.S. Census, which collects data 
decennially to reallocate districts among the fifty states.25 Traditionally, 
state legislatures exercised the power to redistrict once district 
reapportionment occurred. The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he 
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature.”26 
Commonly referred to as the Elections Clause,27 the Constitution has 
historically authorized state legislatures to redraw—or in some cases, to 
choose not to redraw28—congressional seats. In modern redistricting 
cycles, the Supreme Court has mandated equal-population voting districts 
and enforced requirements of the Voting Rights Act to provide equal 
opportunity for minority populations.29  
Likewise, politically motivated gerrymandering has existed since the 
Constitution authorized legislatures to redistrict.30 In recent years, 
however, political parties have increasingly manipulated redistricting 
rules for their own benefit.31 To combat this, many states saw efforts to 
                                                                                                                     
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 25. See 13 U.S.C. § 141 (2012). For a discussion of the U.S. Census’s evolution, see 
generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 6, at 7–21. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 27. E.g., Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2659 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4). 
 28. Draper, supra note 7 (“[S]everal states, for much of the 20th century, [did not] bother 
to adjust their district boundaries at all.”). The Supreme Court ruled this practice of not 
redistricting, or alternatively not providing equal population for congressional districts if at all 
possible, as unconstitutional. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983). 
 29. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 6, at 29, 54. 
 30. Michael D. McDonald & Robin E. Best, Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and 
Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases, 14 ELECTION L.J. 312, 312 (2015) (“Gerrymandering has 
been part of American political lexicon and landscape for more than two centuries.”); Draper, 
supra note 7 (noting the Virginia legislature’s 1788 gerrymandering of Virginia’s fifth 
congressional district to set up a political battle between future Presidents James Madison and 
James Monroe). The actual term “gerrymandering” was coined after Madison’s Vice President, 
Elbridge Gerry, “presided over a redrawing of [Massachusetts] so blatant in its partisan 
manipulations that the . . . shape of one . . . district resembled a salamander.” Id. 
 31. Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1369, 1379–
80 (2012) (observing the “increasing efficiency” of partisan gerrymandering); see also Conner 
Johnston, Comment, Proportional Voting Through the Elections Clause: Protecting Voting Rights 
Post-Shelby County, 62 UCLA L. REV. 236, 253–57 (2015) (describing how parties use the 
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enact various types of redistricting reform. Proposals and goals of those 
advocating for reform often included factors such as “greater 
transparency, . . . third-party map submissions, citizen approval [by] 
direct [vote], careful vetting for conflict of interest, [and] partisan and 
racial balance,” as well as “neutral criteria” including geographic 
considerations.32  
However, enacting redistricting reform via initiative has not been very 
successful historically.33 Even as late as 2005, independent redistricting 
had suffered several voter-based setbacks.34 Yet reform-minded 
redistricting activists became even more vocal in their support for 
independent proposals.35 Some states, like Florida, enacted guidelines 
restricting legislatures from excessive partisan gerrymandering while 
urging the use of neutral criteria.36 Other states directly removed the 
redistricting power from the legislature. For instance, in Iowa, the 
authority to redistrict congressional and state districts lies with 
“nonpartisan, administrative agency of the [Iowa] legislature,” which 
draws the districts without access to data regarding incumbency or 
political preferences.37 Voters in Arizona and California took a further 
step by enacting independent redistricting commissions, which some 
heralded as the “boldest departure[] from the traditional legislative 
redistricting model” for including many of the factors advocates desired 
for an ideal redistricting reform package.38 These efforts reflect a growing 
                                                                                                                     
Voting Rights Act to create partisan gerrymanders); Draper, supra note 7 (noting how computer 
software enables partisan gerrymanders to be much more accurate). 
 32. See Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE 
L.J. 1808, 1812 (2012). 
 33. Barbara Norrander & Jay Wendland, Redistricting in Arizona, in REAPPORTIONMENT 
AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 180 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011) (“[There were] failures in eight 
out of the 12 attempts to use the initiative process to create independent redistricting commissions 
between 1936 and 2005.”). 
 34. See Michael S. Kang, De-rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of 
Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 667 (2006) (referencing the voter rejection of 
commission proposals in both California and Ohio). Ironically, voters in these same states later 
approved redistricting reform when new proposals were placed on the ballot. See Mac Donald, 
supra note 9, at 474, 477; Jim Siegel, Voters Approve Issue to Reform Ohio’s Redistricting 
Process, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Nov. 4, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/
stories/public/2015/election/ohio-state-issue-1-redistricting.html. 
 35. See, e.g., Model State Redistricting Reform Criteria, FAIRVOTE.ORG, http://www.fairvot 
e.org/redistricting#model_state_redistricting_reform_criteria (last visited Aug. 9, 2016). 
 36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 37. Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 
848 (1997); see also Tracy Jan, Iowa Keeping Partisanship off the Map, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 8, 
2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/12/08/iowa-redistricting-takes-partisanship 
-out-mapmaking/efehCnJvNtLMIAFSQ8gp7I/story.html (discussing the effects of Iowa’s redistricting 
system). 
 38. Cain, supra note 32, at 1812. 
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trend of states moving toward independent redistricting reform, but 
reform efforts soon faced an existential challenge. 
II.  PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH 
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES 
While several redistricting issues, such as racial gerrymandering, are 
frequently litigated,39 many questions regarding partisan gerrymandering 
remain unsettled.40 Given this uncertainty, voters have increasingly 
limited or removed their state legislatures’ power to redistrict. In 2011, 
one of the most controversial redistricting reform vehicles was the AIRC, 
which almost immediately rankled the Arizona legislature.41 Although 
unsurprising, given other recent controversies involving the Arizona 
legislature,42 this conflict ultimately resulted in litigation that led to the 
Supreme Court resolving one of the questions concerning partisan 
gerrymandering: whether the Constitution prohibits all non-legislative 
redistricting.43 
A.  Much Ado About a Commission 
Even before the AIRC, the Arizona legislature frequently faced 
litigation over the redistricting plans it enacted.44 In response, in 2000, 
Arizona voters approved Proposition 106, a redistricting-reform ballot 
initiative.45 Proposition 106 amended the Arizona constitution to set 
standards for the newly established AIRC.46 According to these 
standards, legislative party leaders select four commission members from 
                                                                                                                     
 39. This is not to say that the law regarding racial gerrymandering and the Voting Rights 
Act is settled. Most recently, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
Voting Rights Act’s coverage provision, which effectively ended the preclearance procedure for 
determining whether a redistricting map was a racial gerrymander ahead of time. See 133 S. Ct. 
2612, 2631 (2013). 
 40. McDonald & Best, supra note 30, at 312. 
 41. See Marc Lacey, Arizona Governor and Senate Oust Redistricting Leader, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/us/chairwoman-of-arizona-redistricting-
commission-ousted.html (discussing the ouster of one of the five AIRC commissioners). 
 42. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (holding that federal law 
preempted several provisions of Arizona’s controversial S.B. 1070); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & 
S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The President and Immigration Federalism, 68 FLA. L. REV. 101, 105 
(2015).  
 43. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 
(2015). 
 44. See Cain, supra note 32, at 1830–31 (noting issues with the legislature’s maps in three 
different redistricting cycles). 
 45. Id. at 1831.  
 46. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1. 
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a citizen pool of twenty-five finalists.47 In turn, these members select a 
chairperson not “registered with any party already represented on the 
[AIRC]” from the pool.48 In redistricting, the AIRC must create equal-
population districts, ensure political competitiveness, preserve 
communities of interest, and take into account several geographic 
considerations.49 The AIRC only suffered minimal setbacks in its initial 
redistricting cycle.50 
During the next redistricting cycle, however, the AIRC’s selection 
process received much more scrutiny.51 Controversy quickly arose after 
the selection of the “independent” chairperson, Colleen Mathis.52 
Although registered as an independent, Mathis’s husband had 
Democratic affiliations, raising questions about Mathis’s actual 
impartiality.53 Arizona Republican leaders accused her of improper 
conduct and “skewing the redistricting process toward Democrats.”54 
After the maps’ release, Mathis was ousted from the AIRC for “gross 
misconduct.”55 Nonetheless, the Arizona Supreme Court reinstated 
Mathis,56 which led to the commission subsequently approving similarly 
drawn maps.57 
Unable to alter the AIRC’s composition, the Arizona legislature sued 
in federal court.58 The legislature alleged that creating the AIRC violated 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Id. § 1(3)–(5). 
 48. Id. § 1(8). 
 49. Id. § 1(14). Like all other states, the AIRC must comply with the Voting Rights Act. Id. 
 50. See Cain, supra note 32, at 1832. The AIRC’s map was challenged on the grounds that 
it did not create enough “competitive districts,” but the case was dismissed because the petitioner 
failed to “meet its burden of establishing that the [2001] plan lack[ed] a reasonable basis.” Ariz. 
Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676, 682, 
689 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc). 
 51. See Evan Wyloge, Critics Say Partisan Fights Take New Shape in ‘Independent’ 
Redistricting, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Mar. 15, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/ 
2011/03/15/critics-say-partisan-fight-takes-new-shape-in-indepe 
ndent-redistricting/. 
 52. Lacey, supra note 41. 
 53. Marc Lacey, Arizona Redistricting Panel Is Under Attack, Even Before Its Work Is 
Done, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/us/04redistrict.html. 
 54. Lacey, supra note 41; accord Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Redistricting Chief Ousted, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Nov. 2, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/articles 
/2011/11/01/20111101arizona-redistricting-brewer-wants-chair-Mathis-removed.html. 
 55. Pitzl, supra note 54. An Arizona governor may only remove an AIRC member “for 
substantial neglect of duty, gross misconduct in office, or inability to discharge the duties of 
office,” and two-thirds of the Arizona Senate must concur. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(10). 
 56. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Brewer, 275 P.3d 1267, 1278 (Ariz. 2012). 
 57. Alex Isenstadt, Colleen Mathis’s Revenge, POLITICO: DAVID CATANESE BLOG (Dec. 20, 
2011, 10:23 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/david-catanese/2011/12/colleen-mathiss-revenge-
108259. 
 58. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 
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the Constitution’s Elections Clause, as voters were controlling 
redistricting instead of state legislators.59 More specifically, the crux of 
the legislature’s argument was that “[t]he word ‘Legislature’ in the 
Elections Clause [only meant] the representative body which makes the 
laws of the people,” meaning “[n]o State can constitutionally divest its 
Legislature entirely of the redistricting authority.”60 After recognizing 
that the Arizona legislature had standing,61 a federal district court held 
that the Elections Clause permitted the AIRC’s creation, as Arizona’s 
“lawmaking power plainly includes the power to enact laws through 
[voter] initiative.”62 The district court also affirmed a broader 
interpretation of “Legislature” in the Elections Clause.63 After this ruling, 
the Supreme Court postponed jurisdiction and addressed the matter.64 
B.  “Legislature” Means More than Legislature 
This Comment centers its analysis on the Elections Clause discussion 
in Arizona State Legislature rather than on the standing discussion.65 
First, the Supreme Court provided much-needed clarity on its views 
concerning partisan gerrymandering. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
author of the opinion, explicitly recognized that “[p]artisan 
gerrymanders . . . [are incompatible] with democratic principles,” setting 
                                                                                                                     
(2015). 
 59. See Brief for Appellant at 42, 47, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314). 
 60. Joint Appendix at 21, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314). 
 61. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 
1050 (D. Ariz. 2014) (“[The Arizona legislature’s] loss of redistricting power constitute[d] a 
concrete injury.”), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2652. 
 62. Id. at 1056. One judge dissented on this point, believing that the AIRC 
unconstitutionally denied the Arizona legislature “the ability to have any outcome-defining effect 
on the congressional redistricting process.” Id. at 1058 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 63. See id. at 1055–56 (majority opinion) (“The Supreme Court’s decisions . . . ‘provided a 
clear and unambiguous answer . . . twice explaining that the term “Legislature” in the Elections 
Clause refers not just to a state’s legislative body but more broadly to the entire lawmaking process 
of the state.’” (quoting Brown v. Sec’y of State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012)). 
Incidentally, Brown upheld the Fair Districts Florida initiative, or Amendment Six, against a 
challenge that it was procedurally and substantively unconstitutional. See Brown, 668 F.3d at 
1285. 
 64. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 65. The majority also thoroughly discussed whether the Arizona legislature possessed 
standing and determined that there was an “injury in the form of [an] ‘invasion of a legally 
protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent.’” Id. at 2663 
(quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)). The Court noted that 
the alleged injury was not “premature, nor . . . too ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ to establish 
standing,” as any attempt to enact a competing plan would immediately conflict with the Arizona 
constitution. Id. at 2663–64 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
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the tone for the rest of the decision.66 The majority then proceeded to 
deduce principles from relevant precedent, first noting that precedent 
established that “the word [Legislature] encompassed a veto power 
lodged in the people,” not just the representative body.67 The Court then 
analyzed other early precedent to differentiate various uses of the term 
“Legislature” in the Constitution, distinguishing the “lawmaking” 
function of state legislatures from their other constitutional functions.68 
The Court noted that, normally, lawmaking “must be in accordance with 
the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments” and 
further that the Elections Clause did not “endow the legislature of the 
State with power to enact laws in any manner other than that . . . [State’s] 
constitution.”69 Justice Ginsburg strategically distinguished the concept 
of lawmaking from just a legislative body here. Her discussion previously 
examined Arizona’s constitutionally approved voter-initiative process, 
showing that it was a form of lawmaking, and thus constitutional.70 In 
this manner, the majority demonstrated that a state constitution may grant 
lawmaking power to a non-legislative party, whether an executive or a 
state’s citizens.71 
Next, the majority addressed one of the dissenting arguments72: If 
“Legislature” in the Constitution encompasses more than just state 
legislatures, and even includes a state’s citizens, why was the Seventeenth 
Amendment even necessary, since that amendment’s purpose was to 
enable “the people” rather than “‘the Legislature’ of each state” to elect 
senators, as originally prescribed by the Constitution?73 In other words, 
why was it necessary to transfer this power from the state legislatures to 
the people if the term “Legislature” includes the people? In light of its 
previous discussion, the majority dismissed this argument,74 citing 
precedent stating that “legislature” has several meanings within the U.S. 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 2658 (second alteration in original) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 
(2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 67. Id. at 2666. 
 68. See id. at 2666–67. 
 69. Id. at 2667 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367–68 (1932)). 
 70. See id. at 2660–61 (noting that the Arizona constitution established Arizona voters on 
“equal footing” with the Arizona legislature). 
 71. Compare id. (discussing voter-initiative power to establish a redistricting commission), 
with Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366, 368 (upholding the Minnesota governor’s veto power on 
redistricting maps). 
 72. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2667–68. 
 73. See id. at 2677–78, 2681 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 2667–68 (majority opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3). 
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Constitution.75 Ultimately, the Court held that there was “no 
constitutional barrier” to lawmaking via voter initiative.76  
After rejecting the claim that the Elections Clause conflicted with a 
federal statute permitting Congress to adopt redistricting maps without 
legislative involvement,77 the majority turned to whether the AIRC was 
constitutional. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the Court held that 
Arizona voters could enact redistricting reform via independent 
commissions without violating the Elections Clause.78 Again noting 
Arizona’s constitution permitted lawmaking via voter initiative, the 
majority determined that “the people,” similarly to a legislative body, 
may delegate their lawmaking power to an independent redistricting 
commission.79  
Turning to the Elections Clause, the majority declared its central 
purposes to be “‘the Framers’ insurance against . . . a State [refusing] to 
provide [congressional] election[s]’ . . . . [and] to act as a safeguard 
against manipulation of electoral rules by politicians . . . to entrench 
themselves or place their interests over those of the electorate.”80 Thus, 
the Elections Clause cannot be reasonably interpreted to prevent a state 
from allocating lawmaking power to “the people,” as that interpretation 
would run contrary to the historic role of “States as laboratories.”81 
Finally, the majority warned that the dissent’s interpretation would 
invalidate all initiative-enacted redistricting commissions and that a wide 
array of other initiatives enacted via the people’s lawmaking ability 
would likely suffer the same fate.82 Invoking the ideals of direct 
democracy,83 the majority adopted a legally sound and practical solution 
to the controversy.  
                                                                                                                     
 75. Id. at 2668. Later, the majority pointed out that even during the founding, several 
dictionaries defined “legislature” as encompassing all lawmaking power. See id. at 2671 
(discussing early dictionary definitions of “legislation”). 
 76. Id. at 2668. 
 77. See id. at 2668–71 (dissecting the legislature’s arguments against a federal statute with 
the provision’s legislative background and prior Court precedent). 
 78. Id. at 2671. 
 79. Id. at 2671–72. At oral argument, the Arizona legislature’s counsel conceded that a 
legislature could delegate its redistricting power to a commission. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 21, at 15–16. 
 80. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2672 (quoting Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of 
Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013)) (deriving support from both the Federalist Papers and 
James Madison’s discussions of the Elections Clause). 
 81. Id. at 2672–73 (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009)). 
 82. Id. at 2676–77 (noting that popular initiatives regulating voter registration and straight-
ticket voting as well as “[c]ore aspects of the electoral process” in state constitutions, which were 
ratified by convention as opposed to state legislatures, would be endangered). 
 83. See id. at 2677. 
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C.  The Dissent’s Pre-Seventeenth Amendment Interpretation of 
“the Legislature” 
While Arizona State Legislature produced three detailed dissents 
attacking the majority’s various positions, this Comment focuses on 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s dissent discussing the Elections Clause.84 
His dissent first invoked the Seventeenth Amendment before 
sarcastically criticizing its drafters for not just interpreting “the 
Legislature” in Article I, Section 3, as “the people.”85 Claiming the 
majority’s interpretation ignored supportive evidence, the Chief Justice 
criticized the historical sources—“founding era dictionaries”—the 
majority used to construe “legislature,” while relying on other historical 
sources to support a strict textualism interpretation of the term.86 Yet the 
claim that “any ambiguity about the meaning of ‘the Legislature’ is 
removed” when presented with other founding-era sources is puzzling,87 
given the existence of separate historical schools of thought on the term’s 
actual definition.88 The dissent further argued that the majority was 
amending the Elections Clause “by judicial decision.”89 
Chief Justice Roberts’s strongest argument focused on the Court’s 
previous invalidation of provisions in state constitutions imposing term 
limits on federal representatives, although those limits would give the 
people more control over their representation.90 While an interesting 
analogy, the Constitution’s Qualifications Clauses are much less 
ambiguous than the Elections Clause and pertain to an almost exclusively 
federal domain.91 Additionally, using a case decided by the House 
Elections Committee in 1866, his dissent argued that state legislatures 
                                                                                                                     
 84. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas also condemned the majority’s 
interpretation of the Elections Clause. See id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding the 
majority’s interpretation of “legislature”); id. at 2697–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dismissing the 
Court’s tradition of ballot initiatives as inconsistent while viewing the majority’s support for the 
AIRC as “faux federalism”). Both dissents also discussed standing and federalism issues beyond 
this Comment’s scope. 
 85. See id. at 2677 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended 
by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII). 
 86. Id. at 2679–80. 
 87. See id. at 2679. 
 88. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.   
 89. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2682 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Oddly, Chief 
Justice Roberts cited the AIRC’s counsel’s lack of answer [to what?] as support for his claim that 
the majority “judicial[ly]” amended the Constitution. See id. (highlighting a brief dialogue 
between Justice Samuel Alito and the AIRC’s counsel at oral argument). 
 90. See id. at 2690 (“Yet the Court refused to accept ‘that the Framers spent significant time 
and energy in debating and crafting Clauses that could be easily evaded.’” (quoting U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 831 (1995)). 
 91. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (House Qualifications Clause), and id. § 3, cl. 3 
(Senate Qualifications Clause), with id. § 4 (Elections Clause). 
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could override voter-intiative-enacted constitutional provisions 
regulating federal elections under the majority’s reasoning.92 Yet the 
majority disagreed with that case’s value as precedent, remarking that 
courts generally hold that state legislation in direct conflict with that 
state’s constitution is void.93 The dissent also dismissed concerns over 
upending other initiative-created electoral laws as beyond the scope of 
the case.94 
Concluding his dissent, the Chief Justice acknowledged the people’s 
concerns over their redistricting process but, “for better or worse,” 
offered no judicial recourse in his interpretation of the Elections Clause.95 
Rather, he encouraged redistricting advocates to pursue reform via 
Congress or the constitutional amendment process96—a highly unlikely 
proposition given the current, highly partisan era. While this dissent is 
thought-provoking, the majority opinion, which relied on both legal 
precedent and historical record, is more practical and provides the best 
solution for this issue.  
III.  INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING REFORM SURVIVES—WHAT 
NOW? 
In whole, Arizona State Legislature kept the Pandora’s Box of 
partisan gerrymandering closed in Arizona, and likely nationwide. The 
majority’s legal discussion and reliance on historical record demonstrates 
that the Elections Clause should not be interpreted in a way that permits 
state legislatures to manipulate the Clause to retain their redistricting, and 
consequently gerrymandering, powers. Rather, the Clause’s inclusion in 
the U.S. Constitution was to protect the people against those very forms 
of political abuse. Although “[t]he Framers may not have imagined the 
modern initiative process” at the time,97 allowing initiative-based, 
independent redistricting commissions perfectly aligns with the goals of 
the Constitution.  
The majority also provided proponents of redistricting reform a more 
concrete legal ground to stand upon. Many redistricting-reform advocates 
praised the Court’s decision.98 Voters in states possessing various forms 
                                                                                                                     
 92. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2685–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing 
Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett Contested Election Cases, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 152, 41st Cong., 
2d Sess. (1866)).  
 93. See id. at 2674 (majority opinion). 
 94. See id. at 2691 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 2692. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 2674 (majority opinion). 
 98. See, e.g., Bill Chappell, Supreme Court Backs Arizona’s Redistricting Commission 
Targeting Gridlock, NPR (June 29, 2015, 8:12 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/06/29/418521823/supreme-court-backs-arizonas-redistricting-commission-targeting-gri 
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of redistricting commissions could breathe a sigh of relief after the 
ruling.99 In particular, California’s voter-approved commission would not 
have survived a constitutional challenge under the dissent’s interpretation 
of the Elections Clause.100 A federal court later relied on Arizona State 
Legislature to uphold California’s commission.101 The Court’s decision 
has also inspired challenges to partisan congressional gerrymanders. In 
Wisconsin, challengers to that state’s political map filed a complaint in 
federal court after the Supreme Court’s decision, on grounds that the map 
was overtly partisan.102 Partly due to the dicta in Arizona State 
Legislature, this case will likely reach the Supreme Court, which will 
finally have the opportunity to rule whether partisan gerrymanders are 
constitutional. If Arizona State Legislature is any indicator, the Court 
could finally press forward in ending this undemocratic practice. 
However, the Court might take a more nuanced approach, as a decision 
outright ending the practice would drastically increase litigation over 
whether states’ district maps are valid. Depending on the new 
composition of the Supreme Court, this is likely to be a narrow five-to-
four decision. 
Additionally, Arizona State Legislature gave the green light for 
several states to continue pursuing their own independent reforms. Before 
the decision, Ohio’s legislature had passed a series of redistricting 
reforms that required the approval of Ohio voters, but that vote was 
stalled due to the litigation surrounding the AIRC.103 After the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, Ohio’s redistricting-reform package was overwhelmingly 
voted into law the following November election.104 Democratic-leaning 
                                                                                                                     
dlock; Lachman, supra note 14. 
 99. See Tarini Parti, Supreme Court Upholds Arizona Redistricting Committee, POLITICO 
(June 29, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/arizona-redistricting-commission 
-supreme-court-voting-119543 (listing states with redistricting commissions); Taylor, supra note 23 
(discussing the states that could have been forced to redraw lines if the Court decided the case 
differently). 
 100. See Savage, supra note 19. 
 101. Dewitt v. Ryan, No. C 15-05261 WHA, 2016 WL 127291, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 
2016) (dismissing a claim that California’s redistricting commission was unconstitutional). 
 102. See Complaint at 1–2, Whitford v. Nichol, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2015 WL 7294549 
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 17, 2015) (No. 3:cv-00421-bbc); Louis Weisberg, Case to Overturn Wisconsin’s 
Overtly Partisan Political Districts Moves One Step Forward in Court, WIS. GAZETTE (Oct. 3, 2015), 
http://wisconsingazette.com/2015/10/03/case-to-overturn-wisconsins-gerrymandered-legislative-
districts-moves-forward/. Although there were questions as to whether the case could even proceed 
on standing grounds, the federal court hearing Whitford denied a motion to dismiss, allowing the 
cause of action to proceed. See Whitford, 2015 WL 9239016, at *1. 
 103. Jackie Borchardt, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Clears the Way for Ohio Congressional 
Redistricting Reform, CLEVELAND.COM (June 29, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/
open/index.ssf/2015/06/us_supreme_court_ruling_clears.html. 
 104. Siegel, supra note 34. 
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states with their own gerrymanders are also likely to face voter-initiative 
efforts to pass independent redistricting reform. For example, there are 
already efforts underway in states such as Illinois and Maryland.105 
Other courts have also adopted the Supreme Court’s reasoning that 
partisan gerrymanders are not compatible with democracy. For example, 
in ordering the adoption of a map to remedy an unconstitutional racial 
gerrymander in Virginia,106 one federal court rejected an argument that 
the replacement map had to maintain the same partisan makeup as the 
legislature’s original map, using the Arizona State Legislature 
reasoning.107 Another federal court noted that the Court’s decision could 
give gerrymandering “an expiration date.”108 Finally, in litigation over 
Florida’s Fair Districts voter initiative, the Florida Supreme Court 
adopted principles from the Arizona State Legislature majority in 
defending the initiative.109 Recognizing the importance of independent 
reform in the context of democratic principles, the Florida Supreme Court 
set an example for other state courts to follow. Because Florida voters 
enacted these guidelines, a constitutional challenge to their validity 
should not be successful under the principles the Arizona State 
Legislature majority established. Granted, there are differences between 
the AIRC and the Florida initiative, as the latter only restricts the state 
legislature’s redistricting power and does not outright abolish it. Yet 
Arizona State Legislature’s importance in preventing the Florida 
initiative from being struck down should not be understated. In a scenario 
in which the dissent’s principles prevailed, the Court might have struck 
down the Florida initiative’s restrictions on the legislature’s redistricting 
power. However, because voters are able to completely remove a state 
legislature’s redistricting power, they should a fortiori be able to restrict 
that power. Notably, in the months after the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision, no challenge to the Florida initiative has surfaced. 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Gabrielle Levy, Redistricting Reform Gains Steam, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 1, 2015, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/01/redistricting-reform-gains-steam. In fact, the 
redistricting effort in Illinois is facing resistance. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that an initiative 
placing independent redistricting reform on the ballot was unconstitutional under the Illinois 
Constitution. See Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. Of Elections, No. 121077, 2016 WL 54776601 ¶ 49 (Ill. 
Aug. 25, 2016). 
 106. Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL 3604029, at *18–19 (E.D. 
Va. June 5, 2015), appeal dismissed sub nom. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732 (2016). 
 107. See Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 563 (E.D. Va. 2016), stay denied 
sub nom. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 998 (2016). 
 108. Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 628 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (Cogburn, J., 
concurring), stay pending appeal denied sub nom. McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 1001 (2016), 
prob. juris. noted sub nom. McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 2512 (2016). 
 109. See League of Women Voters v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 370 (Fla. 2015) (discussing 
Arizona State Legislature). 
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Despite these developments, Arizona State Legislature has not 
completely clarified the Court’s stance on partisan gerrymandering. After 
the decision, courts have recognized that there is some uncertainty 
surrounding the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the subject.110 Earlier 
in 2015, the Court implied that “political affiliation” was a “traditional 
race-neutral districting principle[]” that a legislature could consider in 
redistricting.111 Likewise, the Court has struggled to establish a test to 
identify when partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional.112 With 
Arizona State Legislature, however, the Court has likely adopted a more 
aggressive stance on the various legal issues surrounding redistricting.  
Immediately after the Arizona State Legislature decision, the Court 
agreed to hear another case involving the AIRC, Harris v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission.113 In 2012, the Harris plaintiffs 
alleged that the AIRC purposefully overpopulated certain legislative 
districts for partisan purposes.114 In a divided opinion, the lower court 
held that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that the 
AIRC violated the “one-person, one-vote” principle derived from the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that “legitimate considerations” outweighed 
any political calculations.115 This became one of the central questions that 
the Harris appellants presented to the Supreme Court.116  
From several of the Justices’ tones at oral arguments, there seems to 
be a growing reluctance to support partisan gerrymandering on the 
Court.117 Moreover, the Court has now had the chance to address the issue 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See, e.g., Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (Payne, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (noting that there is “substantial, and unfortunate, uncertainty present in the Supreme Court’s 
decisions respecting the legitimacy, if any, of [partisan] gerrymandering”); Bethune-Hill v. Va. 
State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 541 & n.21 (E.D. Va. 2015) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s redistricting decisions). 
 111. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1270 (2015). 
 112. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 416–20 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J.) (rejecting a proposed test and discussing other previously disavowed tests in past 
Court precedent); see also Harris v. McCrory, Case No. 1:13-cv-949, 2016 WL 3129213, at *2 
(M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016) (“[I]t may be possible to challenge redistricting plans when partisan 
considerations go ‘too far[,]’ . . . [b]ut it is presently obscure what ‘too far’ means.” (citing Cox 
v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
 113. 135 S. Ct. 2946 (2015).  
 114. Complaint at 2, Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. 
Ariz. 2012) (No. 2:12CV00894); S.M., The Supreme Court Seems Suddenly Worried About 
Partisan Gerrymandering, ECONOMIST: DEMOCRACY IN AM. (Dec. 14, 2015, 7:33 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/12/voter-equality. 
 115. Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1073, 1079–80. 
 116. See Brief for Appellants at i, Harris, 135 S. Ct. 2946 (2015) (No. 14-232), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs_2015
_2016/14-232_appellant.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 117. See S.M., supra note 114 (noting Justice Samuel Alito’s hesitation to affirm his previous 
statements supporting the consideration of partisanship in gerrymandering as valid). 
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of whether partisan gerrymandering is a legitimate consideration for 
redistricting. The Harris district court raised this point, noting that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has not [concretely] decided whether or not political gain 
is a legitimate state redistricting tool.”118 However, in deciding Harris, 
the Court did not determine the legitimacy of partisanship as a 
redistricting factor.119 The Court agreed with the district court’s decision 
and affirmed the plan, holding that there was not enough evidence to 
show that the AIRC’s plan violated the Constitution.120 It determined that 
the population variations mainly reflected the AIRC’s “efforts to achieve 
compliance with the federal Voting Rights Act, not to secure political 
advantage for one party.”121 
Although Harris did not decide whether partisanship was an 
illegitimate consideration in redistricting, the Court has also accepted 
several other redistricting cases.122 In particular, one case centered on 
which interpretation of the term “population” should be used in redrawing 
districts.123 This case—Evenwel v. Abbott124—slightly differed from 
Arizona State Legislature in that the controversy surrounded state 
legislative districts.125 In late 2014, the lower federal court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the wide variations in voter population in Texas’s 
state legislative districts violated the Equal Protection Clause, even 
though the districts had relatively equal total population.126 But like in 
Arizona State Legislature, the resolution of this issue depended on the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutional wording in relation to 
redistricting issues. The Court recognized as much, since the entire 
Evenwel oral argument focused on how past Court precedent interpreted 
the word “population.”127 Following the Arizona State Legislature 
                                                                                                                     
 118. Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.  
 119. Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1309 (2016). 
 120. Id. at 1305. 
 121. Id. at 1307. 
 122. Josh Gerstein, SCOTUS Wrestles with Redistricting Cases, POLITICO: UNDER THE 
RADAR (Dec. 8, 2015, 6:35 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2015/12/scotus-
wrestles-with-redistricting-cases-216569. 
 123. Robert Barnes, Justices Appear Split in Texas Redistricting Challenge, CHI. TRIBUNE 
(Dec. 8, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-supreme-court-one-
person-one-vote-20151208-story.html; Abby Livingston, Texas Redistricting Case Could Have 
National Effect, TEX. TRIBUNE (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/12/08/lawyers-
argue-texas-redistricting-case-/. 
 124. 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015) (mem.). 
 125. See Livingston, supra note 123. Predictably, Evenwel has become a hotbed for partisan 
battles, similar to Arizona State Legislature. See id. 
 126. Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1–2 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). 
 127. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 4–6, Evenwel, 135 S. Ct. 2349, 2015 WL 9919332 (No. 14-
940). 
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principles would require the Court to hold that a more expansive 
interpretation of “population” is required to comply with the one-person, 
one-vote requirement. In contrast, a decision following the main Arizona 
State Legislature dissent would lead to a citizens-only criterion for 
redrawing congressional districts. This approach could potentially lead to 
partisan abuse—especially in states without any independent 
guidelines—and to extensive litigation over not just redistricting, but the 
Census, citizenship, and immigration laws. In fact, the Court ruled that 
there was no reason to “upset a well-functioning approach to districting 
that all 50 States and countless local jurisdictions have followed for 
decades” and kept the total population standard.128 Thus, the Court chose 
the more sensible and judicially efficient choice and followed the 
practical principles discussed in Arizona State Legislature. In light of the 
Harris and Evenwel decisions, the Court may not have a chance to decide 
on partisanship in redistricting until after the 2016 presidential election 
and a new Supreme Court Justice is appointed. 
Upholding these independent redistricting commissions is a strong 
step forward in curbing the excesses of partisan gerrymandering, as state 
legislatures can be reluctant to enact reform. This reluctance likely stems 
in part from states concerned with “unilateral disarmament.” Historically, 
both parties have gerrymandered when the chance presented itself,129 and 
a Democratic or Republican legislature may hesitate to create an 
independent redistricting commission even if the other political party 
guarantees nonpartisan redistrcting—similar to a classic prisoner’s 
dilemma. Self-preservation for both federal and state legislators also 
comes into play, as independent redistricting can result in a different 
partisan makeup of the drawn districts. Thus, for reform advocates voter 
initiative, if a state permits the process, may be the only option to enact 
independent redistricting. 
Beyond redistricting reform, the Arizona State Legislature decision 
has broader impacts. It preserved other voter initiatives related to election 
law, including mail-in ballots and voter ID regulations, on the principle 
that they do not violate the Elections Clause.130 Both political parties 
should be pleased with this result, as Chief Justice Roberts’s reasoning 
might have invalidated many of the parties’ respective priorities enacted 
by voter initiative.131 While other constitutional challenges to some of 
these laws may succeed, they will not be invalidated based on the 
principles stated in Arizona State Legislature. 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132–33 (2016). 
 129. See Draper, supra note 7. 
 130. See Parti, supra note 99. 
 131. See supra Section II.C. 
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CONCLUSION 
Overall, Arizona State Legislature halted an effort opposing 
independent redistricting reform, especially those enacted by voter 
initiative. The majority took a strong stance against partisan 
gerrymandering, bringing clarity to the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
subject. In doing so, the majority relied on sound precedent and legal 
reasoning to reach an outcome that preserved current independent-
redistricting reforms and offered further possibilities to counter the 
abuses of gerrymandering. The case also signals the Court’s shift toward 
bringing clarity to redistricting law. The majority’s stance against 
partisan gerrymandering is an important step in promoting necessary 
independent redistricting reform throughout the United States. With the 
next redistricting cycle less than five years away, the clock is ticking. 
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